

Message Text

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S E C R E T GENEVA 5014

EXDIS/USSALTTWO

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TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: HIGHLIGHTS, POST-PLenary CONVERSATION,
JUNE 17, 1977 (SALT TWO-1234)

1. (ROWNY-BELETSKY, A-1587)

TELEMETRY

BELETSKY SAID THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT METHODS OF TRANSMITTING
TELEMETRY ARE NOT DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES. THEREFORE,
THERE IS NO LINK BETWEEN TELEMETRY AND DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT.
ACCORDINGLY, HE SAID, TELEMETRY SHOULD BE EXEMPT UNLESS THE US
COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT TRANSMITTING TELEMETRY WAS A DELIBERATE
CONCEALMENT MEASURE.

2. (ALESSI-PAVLICHENKO, A-1593)

MIRV VERIFICATION

AT ALESSI'S SUGGESTION THAT PAVLICHENKO APPLY THE SOVIET FORMU-
LATIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF ASSOCIATING A MIRVED MISSILE WITH
PARTICULAR LAUNCHER, PAVLICHENKO REPLIED THAT, ONCE A LAUNCHER
HAD BEEN TESTED BY LAUNCHING A MIRVED MISSILE, THAT LAUNCHER WAS
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A MIRV LAUNCHER BY REASON OF ITS HAVING BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED
FOR MIRV MISSILES. ALESSI ASKED HOW THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THAT
TEST LAUNCHER AND OTHER LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE WAS TO BE MADE.
PAVLICHENKO REPLIED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET FORMULATIONS,
LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE AS THAT WHICH TESTED THE MIRV MISSILE
WOULD BE CONSIDERED MIRV LAUNCHERS ONCE THEY WERE DEPLOYED. IN
RESPONSE, ALESSI SAID THAT, IF HE HAD HEARD PAVLICHENKO CORRECTLY,

A LAUNCHER HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR MIRV MISSILES AND, THEREFORE, IS A MIRV LAUNCHER IF IT HAS BEEN TESTED BY LAUNCHING MIRVED MISSILES AND THAT ALL LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE MIRV LAUNCHERS AS SOON AS THEY ARE DEPLOYED. PAVLICHENKO SAID THAT DESCRIPTION WAS CORRECT, ALESSI ASKED WHETHER THE LAUNCHERS IN THE FIELD HAD TO CONTAIN A MIRV MISSILE TO BE OF THE SAME TYPE. PAVLICHENKO REPLIED THAT THE LAUNCHERS HAD ONLY TO BE OF THE SAME TYPE.

ALESSI ASKED WHETHER, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THE PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT CONSIDERED THE LAUNCHERS AT D&P TO BE OF TWO TYPES AS A RESULT OF APPLYING THEIR PROVISION FOR ARTICLE II.5 TO THAT SITUATION OR WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD INTENDED TO RESOLVE THIS SITUATION IN A SPECIAL MANNER BY PROPOSING THAT THE SIDES AGREE TO CALL THEM TWO TYPES. PAVLICHENKO REPLIED THAT THE SITUATION AT D&P WAS UNIQUE AND THE RESULT OF HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ADDED THAT THE AGREED STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO BE A SPECIFIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AT D&P AND MAJ549.. AT THIS POINT, PAVLICHENKO USED THE TERM "AD HOC" TO DESCRIBE THE PURPOSE THE AGREED STATEMENT. HOWEVER, WHEN ASKED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, HE WAS EVASIVE AND ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE THE FOCUS FROM D&P TO MALMSTROM.

3. (SCHNEITER/DEWING - SHCHUKIN, A-1592)

A. MIRV VERIFICATION

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SCHNEITER NOTED THAT TODAY'S SOVIET STATEMENT HAD CALLED THE D&P SITUATION UNIQUE, AND HE WONDERED IN WHAT SENSE, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THE SITUATION WAS UNIQUE. SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT AS AN EXAMPLE HE WOULD USE THE SITUATION AT MALMSTROM. AS HE UNDERSTOOD, AT MALMSTROM THERE WERE LAUNCHERS FOR MIRVED ICBMS, AND THESE WERE ONE TYPE OF LAUNCHER WHICH WERE FOR ONE CERTAIN TYPE OF MISSILE. THERE WERE ALSO AT MALMSTROM LAUNCHERS OF ANOTHER TYPE FOR NON-MIRVED ICBMS. SCHNEITER ASKED IF SHCHUKIN WAS THEREFORE INDICATING THAT AT D&P THERE WERE LAUNCHERS OF ONE TYPE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVED ICBMS AND LAUNCHERS OF ANOTHER TYPE EQUIPPED WITH NON-MIRVED ICBMS; AND THAT AT NO OTHER DEPLOYMENT FIELD WAS THERE SUCH A MIXTURE OF TWO TYPES OF LAUNCHERS - ONE FOR MIRVED ICBMS AND ONE FOR NON-MIRVED ICBMS. SCHNEITER SAID THAT BY "DEPLOYMENT FIELD" HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO USE THE SAME TERMINOLOGY WHICH SHCHUKIN AND MAY HAD USED IN SOME OF THEIR EARLIER DISCUSSION. SHCHUKIN CONFIRMED THAT THAT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING AND ADDED THAT PERHAPS HE COULD HELP CHARACTERIZE THE AREAS BY INDICATING THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS AT D&P AS AT MALMSTROM.

SHCHUKIN WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HE HAD NOT CALLED IT UNIQUE WHEN IN THE US THERE HAD BEEN CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS OF MINUTEMAN I AND LAUNCHERS OF MINUTEMAN II INTO LAUNCHERS OF MINUTEMAN III.

HE DID NOT KNOW HOW ONE COULD CONVERT ALL OF THE LAUNCHERS IN A DEPLOYMENT FIELD AT ONCE; THEREFORE, FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME THERE WOULD BE TWO TYPES OF LAUNCHERS PRESENT WHILE THIS CONVERSION PROCESS WAS UNDERWAY. THIS WAS NOT THE UNIQUE SITUATION ABOUT WHICH HE SPOKE. SCHNEITER SAID, IF HE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY, SHCHUKIN WAS SAYING THAT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THE "STEADY-STATE" SITUATION, AND NOT THE TRANSIENT SITUATION. SHCHUKIN CONCURRED, ALTHOUGH OBSERVING THAT THE PERMANENCE OF ANY SUCH SITUATION IS QUESTIONABLE, IN THAT EVENTUALLY CHANGES ALWAYS OCCUR. HE HAS SAID THAT IT WAS UP TO THE DRAFTING GROUP TO FORMULATE THE DETAILS OF LANGUAGE WITH RESPECT TO THE UNIQUENESS OF THE SITUATIONS AT D&P AND AT MALMSTROM. THERE MAY BE OTHER FEATURES TO BE CONSIDERED, BUT THE FACT THAT NO CONVERSION WAS TAKING PLACE THERE WAS ONE WHICH OCCURRED TO HIM.

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B. HEAVY BOMBER DEFINITION

SCHNEITER SAID THAT HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN TO THE SOVIET JUNE 14 STATEMENT AND ASK ANOTHER QUESTION. THE SOVIETS HAD DEFINED THE TERM "CHARACTERISTICS" TO MEAN THE COMBAT RADIUS OF A BOMBER WITHOUT INFLIGHT REFUELING, WITH THE BOMBER EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES FOR ONE OPERATIONAL MISSION. SCHNEITER'S QUESTION WAS, DID THIS MEAN THE AIRCRAFT WOULD CARRY A FULL LOAD OF BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES? SHCHUKIN ANSWERED YES, REMARKING THAT NEXT WE WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS A FULL LOAD. HE THOUGHT IT DOUBTFUL THAT A BOMBER WOULD FLY A COMBAT MISSION WITH NO BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, EVEN THOUGH ITS RADIUS WOULD BE GREATER IF IT DID. HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT ONE WOULD CONTINUE TO ADD BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES UNTIL ALL OF THE DEVICES FOR ATTACHING THEM HAD BEEN FILLED. HE LIKENED IT TO A COMMERCIAL AIRLINER WHICH WAS CONSIDERED TO BE FULL WHEN ALL OF ITS SEATS WERE OCCUPIED. SHCHUKIN ADDED THAT THE RADIUS SO DEFINED IS GREATER THAN SUCH A BOMBER ACTUALLY WOULD HAVE DURING ACTION ON A COMBAT MISSION. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE BOMBER ALWAYS MUST HAVE AN ADDITIONAL RESERVE FOR MANEUVERING, AND WHEN IT RETURNS IT MUST HAVE FUEL IN CASE OF DIFFICULTY OR DELAYS IN LANDING. THUS THE DEFINITION WAS THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE RADIUS OF OPERATION WITH A FULL LOAD OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OR BOMBS ON A ROUND-TRIP. EARLE

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